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"[Olpinions were  so various  and at first so crude that it
was necessary they  should be  long debated before any
uniform system of opinion could be formed.  Meantime
the minds of the members were changing, and much was
to be gained by  a yielding and accommodating spirit ...
[No man felt himself obliged to  retain his opinion any
longer than he was satisfied of their propriety and truth,
and was open to the force of argument."
-James  Madison
"The spirit of liberty [is that spirit which] is not too sure
that it is right."
-Learned  Hand
My topics in this lecture are the myths that the Dred
Scott case  created,  the  myths  that Americans  have
created  about it, and the  true lessons of the case  for
three of the great constitutional issues of the current
era: affirmative action, homosexuality,  and the right
to die.
THE CONTINUING  RELEVANCE OF DRED  SCOTT
The  Dred Scott case  was probably  the  most  impor-
tant case  in the history of the Supreme Court of the
United  States.  Indeed,  it was  probably  the  most
important constitutional  case  in the  history  of any
nation  and  any  court. But  most of us  have little  if
any sense of what it means or was  even about.  Even
within  the legal  culture,  the case  is  taught infre-
quently in constitutional  law  courses;  outside of the
legal culture,  the case  is pretty well forgotten,  or at
most a footnote  in discussions of the Civil War.
We  should  note right  at the  outset  some of the
many remarkable facts about the case.
* Dred Scott was  the  first Supreme  Court  case
*  Karl  N.  Llewellyn  Distinguished  Service  Professor  of
Jurisprudence,  University of Chicago.
1since Marbury v.  Madison  invalidating a federal  law.
Since Marbury created judicial review  in the context
of a denial of jurisdiction, Dred Scott might plausibly
be  said  to  be  the first  real  exercise  of the  power of
judicial review.
* Dred Scott was the first great  effort by the Court
to  take an  issue  of political  morality out  of politics.
In  that sense,  it  is the  great ancestor of many  New
Deal and Warren Court cases.
* Dred Scott was the birthplace  of the controver-
sial idea  of "substantive  due process,"  used  in Roe v.
Wade, in many important  cases endangering  the reg-
ulatory/welfare state, and in  the recent  cases involv-
ing the "right to die."
* Dred Scott was one of the first great cases unam-
biguously  using  the "intent  of the  framers"  and in
that sense it was the great precursor of the method of
Justice Scalia and Judge Bork.
THREE MYTHS
Let  me now identify  the great  myths involving  Dred
Scott. The first and perhaps most important  one was
created  by  the Dred  Scott case  itself:  The  myth  is
that  the original  Constitution protected, supported,
and  entrenched  slavery.  On  this  view,  the
Constitution  was  emphatically  pro-slavery.  As  a
legal matter, this is a myth in the simple sense that it
is false:  The Constitution  does  not  support or
entrench  slavery.'  But many  people think  the myth
is  true;  in  fact Justice  Thurgood  Marshall,  in  his
remarks  about  the bicentennial,  basically  agreed
with the Dred Scott Court.
The  second  myth comes  from the  conventional
American "reading" of Dred Scott.  According to that
reading,  Chief Justice Taney  was  a  morally  obtuse
person heading a morally obtuse Court that it took  a
Civil  War to  overturn. This  is a  different  kind  of
myth. It is not exactly false.  But it  is hardly  the full
story;  it  leaves  enormous  gaps.  An adequate  under-
standing  of Dred Scott  lies  elsewhere.  It has  a  great
deal  to do  with the  appropriate  role  of the Supreme
Court  in American  government.  It has  to do  with
how a democratic citizenry governs itself.
1 Of course the Constitution did not abolish slavery. In fact it rec-
ognized the existence  of the institution of slavery,  but without endors-
ing or entrenching  it. See below.
2The  third  myth  is  a  revisionist reading  of the
case,  coming  from  Justice  Scalia and  others  critical
of the  Warren  Court.  Here  is myth #3:  Dred Scott
was wrong because  the Court abandoned  the "inten-
tions of the  framers"  in  favor of its own conception
of social  policy. On  this view,  Dred Scott was wrong
because  it was  politics  rather  than  law,  and  it  was
politics  rather than  law  because  it  abandoned  the
Constitution,  understood  as  a historical  document.
This myth has  more than a kernel  of truth in it, for
Dred Scott cannot be  said to  have  been an accurate
reading of the original understanding of the framers.
But  myth #3  qualifies  as  a  myth  because  Dred  Scott
was  very much  and  very  self-consciously  an  "origi-
nalist" opinion,  that  is, it purported  to draw nearly
all of its support from the views of the framers:
"It is not the province of the court to decide upon
the justice or injustice, the policy or impolicy, of these
laws.  The decision  of that question  belonged  to the
political  or  law-making  power;  to  those  who  formed
the sovereignty  and  framed  the Constitution.  The
duty of the court  is, to.interpret  the  instrument  they
have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the
subject, and to administer  it as we find it, according to
its true intent and meaning when it was adopted."
2
To replace  these myths,  I suggest that  the defect
of Dred  Scott  lay  largely  in  the Court's effort  to
resolve, once  and for all time, an issue  that was split-
ting the  nation  on political  and moral  grounds.
More  particularly,  we  should  understand  Dred Scott
to suggest that in general  and  if it possibly can,'  the
Supreme  Court  should avoid  political  thickets.  It
should  leave  Great  Questions  to politics.  This  is
because  the Court  may  answer  those  questions
incorrectly,  and  because  it  may well  make  things
worse even if it answers correctly.
What I will  suggest  is that the Court should-as
the Dred  Scott Court  did not-proceed  casuistically,
and this  in two different  ways. First,  it should gener-
ally decide  cases rather  than  set down broad  rules.
Second,  it should  try to avoid  issues of basic  princi-
ple and  instead attempt to reach  incompletely theo-
rized agreements  on particular cases.'  By  this term  I
2  60 US at 405.
These two qualifications  are important. See below.
4 I describe  these ideas  in  more detail  in  Cass R.  Sunstein,  Legal
Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
3mean concrete  judgments on which people  can con-
verge  from diverse  foundations.  In this way  the
Court can both model and promote a crucial  goal of
a liberal political system: to make it possible for peo-
ple  to agree  when  agreement  is  necessary,  and  to
make it  unnecessary for people to agree  when  agree-
ment is impossible.
These  claims  have  a set  of implications  for con-
temporary questions. I deal with three such questions
here:  affirmative  action, the right to  die,  and homo-
sexuality.  My  unifying  theme  is  that  the Court
should generally adopt strategies  that promote rather
than undermine democratic  reflect and debate.  I sug-
gest,  first  and  in  some  ways  foremost,  that  courts
should  not invalidate  affirmative  action. The  court
of appeals' recent decision in the University of Texas
case  was hubristic  in the same  sense as  Dred Scott-
an  effort, with insufficient constitutional  warrant, to
remove  a big  issue  of principle  from politics.  The
attack  on  affirmative  action  is  a legitimate  and in
some  ways salutary  part of political debate;  as a  legal
phenomenon  it reflects  a form of judicial hubris.  At
most, the Court should  invalidate the most irrational
and extreme  affirmative action programs,  and in that
way  attempt  to promote  and  to inform  democratic
deliberation on the underlying issues.
With the right  to die,  things  are  a  bit different;
here  the  problem  is that  the  relevant  laws  are  old
and based  on perhaps  anachronistic  assumptions,
and hence  the  basic  issue  has  not been  subject  to
democratic  debate.  I suggest  that the Court  should
proceed cautiously,  incrementally,  on a fact-specific
basis.  Instead of vindicating a  broad "right to priva-
cy,"  courts  might say-if they are  to play  any role  at
all-that intrusions on individual liberty may not be
based  on old  laws  rooted  in different  circumstances
and perhaps  anachronistic values,  and that any such
intrusions must be supported  by  more  recent acts of
political  deliberation.  For the  right  to die,  the  best
approach  lies  in a form  of self-conscious  dialogue
between courts and legislatures.
In  some  ways the question  of discrimination  on
grounds of sexual orientation is the hardest-at least
if one  believes,  as  I do,'  that such  discrimination  is
generally  unacceptable  under constitutional  princi-
I acknowledge  that this is an unconventional  view and I do not
attempt to defend this belief here.
4ples as they  are appropriately  understood.  I will sug-
gest a form of incrementalism  in support of a  consti-
tutional attack on discrimination against  homosexu-
als. Even if courts  believe that the attack is plausible
on  its  merits, they  should  hesitate  before entering
this "political thicket." They should follow President
Lincoln, not Chief Justice Taney.
DRED  SCOTT: DRAMATIS  PERSONAE
Every  myth  is filled  with  people,  usually  people  of
high drama. This  is certainly  true  of the  Dred Scott
story.  Let  me  tell you  something  about  the  people
behind the Dred Scott case.
Who  was Dred  Scott? We lack  have full answers.
It  appears that he was born  in about  1799-around
the ratification  of the  Bill  of Rights-and that he
was quite  short, about  five feet  tall. His  real  name
may have been Sam. The only picture of Dred Scott,
taken  in  1856,  shows  him  in  his  mid-fifties.  After
interviewing  Scott  in  1857,  a St.  Louis  newspaper
said that Scott was "illiterate  but not ignorant"  and
that he had a strong common sense sharpened by his
many  travels.  There  is reason  to  believe  that Scott
provided  initiative  for his  case.  Immediately  before
the  suit was  filed,  Scott  tried  to buy his freedom
from  his  owner,  Mrs.  Emerson. She  declined.  The
Dred Scott case followed.
Since  childhood  Scott  lived  in Virginia  with
Peter Blow and his wife Elizabeth. The Blows moved
from Virginia  to  Alabama and  then, in  1830,  left
with seven children  (including Taylor,  whose  name
you should  remember)  and  six slaves  for St. Louis.
This  was not  a  good  place  for  the  family.  Peter
Blow's  business  venture,  the Jefferson  Hotel,  did
poorly;  Elizabeth  Blow died  in  1831;  Peter  died a
year later.
After  Peter Blow's  death, one  Dr. John  Emerson
bought  one of  his slaves,  and  in  1833  took that
slave,  Dred Scott, into service  at Fort Armstrong,  in
Illinois.  Illinois  was  a nonslave  state,  and this  was
important.  Scott  lived  for an  extended  period  in  a
state that outlawed  slavery,  raising a key question in
his  case:  Was he  thereby  freed?  This  became  a  key
question  in the case.
In 1838  Emerson took Scott for  a second  sojourn
into Fort  Snelling,  near  what  is  now known  as St.
Paul, Minnesota.  Thus Scott, held as  a slave  in the
5free state of Illinois for more than two years, was liv-
ing in a territory  in which slavery  was banned by the
Missouri  Compromise.  There  Scott met Harriet
Robinson,  a  slave  about twenty  years  old;  Harriet
was  sold  to  Emerson  and the  two were  married,  a
marriage  that lasted  until his  death  in  1858.  Four
children  were born  to them;  the  two  sons  died  as
infants,  but two  daughters (Eliza,  born in  1838,  and
Lizzie, born  in  1847)  survived and became  parties  to
the Dred  Scott case.  Scott stayed  with Emerson until
Emerson's death in 1943.
John Sanford,  Emerson's  brother-in-law,  was  an
executor  of the will.  Dred Scott  was  apparently  in
the  service  of  Mrs.  Emerson's  brother  in law,
Captain Bainbridge,  from  1643 to  1846. On April 6,
1846,  Dred  and Harriet  Scott  brought  suit  against
Irene Emerson. They alleged assault and false  impris-
onment. Dred and Harriet complained that Emerson
had beaten  him  and  imprisoned  him.  And  they
claimed that there were free.
(It  is worth  noting at  this point that  Dred Scott
remained friends with the Blow family long after the
death of Peter and  Elizabeth.  The  Blows  and  their
in-laws were principal  supporters during the lawsuits
between  1846  and  1857.  And  we should  especially
remember Taylor Blow, Dred Scott's benefactor after
he was  freed  and  indeed  until the  day of his death.
Interestingly,  Taylor Blow  was  not opposed  to slav-
ery  in principle.  He  apparently  acted  from personal
bonds extending back to his childhood.)
These, then, are  the people behind the case:  Dred,
Harriet, Eliza and Lizzie Scott, the plaintiffs; Peter and
Blow,  original  owners;  Taylor Blow;  Irene  Emerson
and  her brother-in-law,  John Sanford.  (It should  be
obvious  at this point  that a  mystery  in the Dred Scott
case  is its title:  Why was  the case styled  Dred Scott v.
Sanford? It  could  as easily  have  been  called  Harriet
Scott  v. Emerson. But  as a  woman,  Harriet Scott  was
not supposed  to be the  lead plaintiff in a lawsuit,  and
the defendant  was  the  executor  of the estate  rather
than  the real  owner of Scott. But  there should be  no
mistaking  the fact that the  legal  interests  of Emerson
and Scott were emphatically at stake.)
DRED SCOTT:  THE LAW
Now let us turn to the legal  issues in the  case. Scott
noted that the state constitution  of Illinois abolished
6slavery  and  that  the  Missouri Compromise  banned
slavery  in the  Louisiana  territory.  Hence  Scott
claimed  that he was made  a free man by  virtue of his
sustained  stays  in those  places.  Sanford  responded
that Scott was  not  free,  because  his  former  owner
had  a continuing  property  interest  in him-that  is
what  slavery  meant-and  because  the  federal  gov-
ernment  could not deprive  an  owner  of property
without  due  process of law.  In any case,  Sanford
claimed  that Scott  could  not  sue  in  federal  court,
since  Scott was not  a citizen  of Missouri,  or indeed
of any state.
The  largest  question  in the  case  was  whether
Dred  Scott was still a slave. That case  in turn raised
three principal issues.
First:  Could Scott sue in federal  court? If he was a
citizen  of Missouri,  suing  a citizen of New  York, he
could  indeed  sue under  the  diversity  of citizenship
provision  of the  federal  Constitution,  which  gives
federal  courts  jurisdiction  over  disputes  between
people  domiciled in different states; otherwise not.
Second:  Was the  Missouri  Compromise  consti-
tutional?
Third:  What  was the  effect on Scott's  status  in
Missouri  of the  transportation  of Scott into  non-
slave  states?
The  Supreme  Court  decided  the  case  in  1857,  a
year in which the United States was profoundly split
because  of the  issue of  slavery.  There  can  be no
doubt  that  the Court attempted  to take that  issue
"out of politics"-a point to which I will return.
WAs  DRED ScoTT A CITIZEN?
Justice Taney's opinion held first  that Scott was not
a citizen  of Missouri.  Therefore  the  federal  courts
had no jurisdiction over the case.
This  was  a  complex  issue.  There  is  no definition
of the  term  "citizen" for purposes  of diversity  juris-
diction. Perhaps we should say that whether Scott is
a  citizen  of Missouri  depends  on  Missouri  law.
Perhaps  the question  whether  Scott  is  a  citizen  of
Missouri  depends on whether Scott was still a slave.
No one argued that slaves qualified as citizens.
But Justice Taney  went  very  much  further than
this.  He  did not rely  on  Missouri  law.  Instead  he
argued  very  broadly  that  no person  descended  from
an American slave could ever be  a citizen for consti-
7tutional  purposes.  Under the constitution,  "they are
not included  . . . under the  word citizen  and  can
therefore  claim none  of the  rights  and privileges  of
citizens.  . . " It is here  that Taney  could not rely on
constitutional  text,  which  was  ambiguous,  but
resorted  explicitly  and  self-consciously  to an  under-
standing of original intentions. Thus he wrote:
"On the contrary,  [descendants  of Africans] were at
that time considered as  a subordinate and inferior class
of beings,  who had  been subjugated  by the dominant
race,  and whether  emancipated  or not, yet  remained
subject  to  their authority,  and had  no rights  or privi-
leges  but  such  as  those  who  held the power  and  the
Government might choose to grant them."
As  I have  said,  this  was one  of the first self-con-
sciously  "originalist" opinions  from the  Supreme
Court. On  this issue,  the  Court  spoke for  its under-
standing  of what  the framers  believed.  (We cannot
indict  a method on the ground that it has been misap-
plied.  All I mean to suggest is that  it is worth noting
that the Court was attempting to speak for history and
couched its decision  explicitly in historical terms.)
WAS  THE MISSOURI  COMPROMISE CONSTITUTIONAL?
At first glance,  the Court's  jurisdictional  conclusion
should  have been  the end  of the  matter. If Scott was
not a  citizen  of Missouri,  the  federal  courts  had no
authority  to hear Scott's complaint, and the case should
have been at an end, at least for Chief Justice Taney.
But the Court went on to consider the huge ques-
tion whether  Scott remained  a slave  after  living  in
Illinois  and the Louisiana Territory.  The Court said
that he did.  But why?  This question is much harder
to answer.
Perhaps  Missouri  law  governed  the  question
whether  Scott,  a  resident  there,  was still  a  slave.
Four justices so concluded. This idea is not implausi-
ble,  and for  those  justices, there  was  no  reason  to
speak  to the  constitutional  validity of the Missouri
Compromise.  But  three  of them  did so  anyhow.
Thus a total of six justices concluded  that Scott was
still  a slave  because  the Missouri  Compromise  was
unconstitutional. Why was this so?
Chief Justice  Taney  offered  several arguments.
First,  he said  that Congress'  authority  to  "make  all
needful  Rules  and  Regulations  respecting  the
Territory  or other Property belonging to the United
8States"  did  not  extend  to territories  not  owned  in
1789.  By  itself this should have been sufficient,  but
perhaps  it  did  not  seem  plausible  even to  Chief
Justice Taney, so he offered a second point. Thus he
said  that slavery  was constitutionally  sacrosanct, so
that even if Congress  had authority over  new terri-
tories,  it could not ban slavery there. "[T]he right of
property  in a  slave  is  distinctly  and  expressly
affirmed  in the Constitution."  But  this  too was  an
adventurous  conclusion.  Thus Justice  Taney  added
a third point,  to  the  effect  that Congress'  power
over  the  territories  could  not collide  with  other
constitutional  limitations.  Congress  could  not, for
example, eliminate freedom of speech in the territo-
ries.  And this point  was decisive for the question at
hand.  A  law  that deprives  someone  of property
because  he  has  brought  it into  a particular  place
"could  hardly  be  dignified  with the  name  of due
process  of law."
This  was an  exceptionally  important  moment  in
American  law.  It was the birthplace  of the  idea of
"substantive  due  process,"  the  idea  used  in the
Lochner era cases, in Roe v.  Wade, and in many of the
most controversial decisions in the Court's history.
Why  was  this a  new  idea? On  its  face,  the due
process  clause  appears  to  give people  a  right to  a
hearing  to  contest  factual  findings,  and  Sanford
sought  much more  than that. Does  the  due  process
clause  give  courts  authority  to strike down  legisla-
tion  as  unreasonable  or  as  substantively  unjust?
Before  Dred  Scott, the  Supreme  Court had  not  sug-
gested that it did. The suggestion was textually awk-
ward,  to say  the  least. The due  process clause  seems
to speak of procedure, not of substance.
Even  if the due  process  clause  is  understood  to
have  a substantive  dimension,  there  is a big  prob-
lem  with the Court's  argument.  International  law
had long  held that a master who voluntarily  takes
a  slave into free  territory  therefore  relinquishes  his
property  interest in the  slave.  So long as  the terri-
tory  is  known to be  a free  one,  this is not a "tak-
ing"  of property.  If California  says that people  may
not own lions,  and if a citizen from Arizona takes a
lion  into  California,  there  is no  constitutional
problem  if the  lion  is  removed  and  even  freed.
Even  on Justice Taney's assumptions, his argument
was remarkably brisk and unconvincing.  I return to
this point below.
9A LITTLE HISTORY
It might  appear to you  at this point that the Court
had a narrow route to resolution of the case. Perhaps
a free slave could be deemed a citizen for purposes of
jurisdiction.  And  perhaps  the  Court need not  have
assessed  the constitutionality  of the  Missouri
Compromise.  Perhaps  the  crucial  issue  in the  case
was  whether Missouri  had to  recognize  any  change
in Scott's  status from his  visit  into  free  areas.  If
Missouri  did not have to  recognize  that change,  the
case  was  over. And  if Scott's  stay in  Illinois  pro-
duced  a  change  in status that  Missouri  had  to
respect, the case was over as well.
In fact the  justices  initially concluded  that  they
would  not decide  the largest  issues  in the  case  and
that they  would conclude  very  simply  that  under
Missouri  law,  Scott  was still a slave.  If that was  so,
the case  could be resolved  simply and without broad
pronouncements.  But shortly  after his  election,
President Buchanan wrote to one of the justices with
the suggestion  that it was  important "to destroy  the
dangerous slavery agitation and thus restore peace to
our distracted  country."  A  variety  of factors  moved
Justice  Wayne  to  insist  that the  Court  should deal
with the  two  key  issues-the status  of the  Missouri
compromise  and the  status  of freed  blacks  as  citi-
zens-on  which the  justices  originally  decided  to
remain silent.  Five  justices  eventually  agreed;  all
were from slave states.
Justice  Wayne  later told a  Southern Senator that
he had  "gained  a  triumph  for the  Southern  section
of the  country,  by  persuading  the  chief justice  that
the court could put an end to all further agitation on
the  subject of slavery in the territories."  Here  is the
obvious punch  line:  For  palpable  political reasons,
the Court  was  persuaded  to speak  to all  of the  key
questions. Its obvious goal was to solve, once and for
all time, the great moral and political crisis that slav-
ery had created for the United States of America.
DRED  SCOTT: JUDICIAL HUBRIS
Now  we  are  in  a  position  to  explore  the question:
What was  wrong with the Dred Scott opinion?  Let us
divide potential answers  into two categories:  institu-
tional and  substantive.  The  substantive  answers
have  to do with the best reading of the Constitution.
10The institutional answers have to do with the appro-
priate  role  of the  Supreme  Court  in  American  gov-
ernment.  The  two  are  related,  but  it is both  useful
and important to try to separate  them.
Begin with issues of substance. The Court was not
just reckless but simply wrong to say what it did with
respect  to  the  status  of freed  slaves.  There  was  no
basis  for  the Court's  conclusion  that freed  slaves
could not count as citizens.  In fact some freed slaves
participated  in  the ratification  of the  Constitution
itself;  and  freed  slaves  were  allowed  to  vote  in  at
least five  of the colonies. The Constitution does not
suggest  that  free citizens  do  not stand on  the same
ground as everybody  else.
In fact the text of the Constitution-its infamous
three-fifths  clause-itself undermines  the  Court's
conclusion.  If slaves  count  for  three-fifths  of a
human being for perhaps of apportioning  representa-
tives  (a  provision recognizes without endorsing slav-
ery,  and that itself creates an incentive  to eliminate
slavery),  then freed  slaves  count  as  100% human
beings  for those  purposes.  Hence  the Constitution
expressly  distinguishes  not between  African  and
non-African  descendants,  but  between  slaves  and
free  persons,  whether  African  or not. This part  of
the  constitutional  text  was  not mentioned  in Dred
Scott, but it argues strongly the other way.
More  generally,  the Constitution does  nothing
to  entrench  slavery.  It  recognizes  the existence  of
the  institution  but  does  little  more  than that.
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Certainly  some  of the Constitution's  framers
believed  that slavery  was  acceptable  or  desirable
(though  consider  slaveholder  Jefferson's  suggestion
that "I tremble  for my  country"  when  contemplat-
6  More  particularly,  there  are  three  relevant  provisions.  (1)
Article  I section  9 prevents  Congress from  prohibiting the slave  trade
until  1808.  This  is  hardly  an endorsement  of slavery.  It  gives  slave
states a relatively short period in  which to  import slaves, and then  lets
Congress do  as  it  wishes.  (2)  Article  IV  section  3  requires  nonslave
states  to  return fugitive slaves  to  their owners.  This provision  is
extremely  limited;  it does  not say  anything about  the obligations  of
states to respect slave-owners  who voluntarily come, with their slaves,
into  nonslave  states.  (3)  The so-called  three-fifths  clause,  Article  1,
section  2,  says  that representatives  and  direct  taxes  shall be  appor-
tioned  by  adding to the whole  number of free  persons "three fifths  of
all other persons." This provision  is designed  for purposes of allocating
representatives  and direct taxes. As not, it  creates an incentive to free
slaves, by  giving slave  states more political  power if they become  non-
slave states.  It certainly does not reflect any judgments  that slaves are
just 2/3 of "people."
11ing that  God  is just).  Maybe  a  majority  of them
thought  so.  But they  did not put  that judgment  in
the  Constitution  itself. There  was  no  reason  to
think that freed slaves should not qualify as citizens
for constitutional purposes.
The Court's decision  with respect to the Missouri
Compromise  was  also both reckless  and  wrong.  On
its  face,  congressional  power over  the  territories  is
extremely broad. It is absurd  to  say that that power
was  limited  to  existing  territories.  To be  sure,  that
power cannot  be used  to  violate  the Constitution
itself;  Congress  could  not outlaw  political  dissent
within  the  territories. On  this score  the  Dred Scott
Court was  correct.  But contrary  to the Court's  sug-
gestion,  the Constitution  does not distinctly  and
expressly affirm  the property rights  of slaveowners.  It
recognizes,  somewhat  obliquely,  the  institution  of
slavery.  But  it  did not endorse  that  institution.
Indeed  it forbids Congress  from outlawing  the slave
trade  before  1808,  a provision  that is hardly  a ring-
ing endorsement of the institution of slavery. And as
I have said,  the use of substantive due process-even
if there  is  such thing-was  unsupportable  because
there  is no "taking" of property  when one state gives
people  notice  that certain  goods  (guns,  bombs)  are
not allowed there.
So  much for constitutional  substance.  I think the
institutional issues are more important,  more subtle, and
of more enduring relevance. There  are two points here.
First: The Court reached  out  to  answer  numerous
questions  not requiring  a  judicial  answer  in  the  case
at  hand. Once  it found  that  Scott  was not a citizen,
the case was at an end. The Court lacked jurisdiction.
Or it could have said very modestly, and without pro-
nouncing on the Missouri  Compromise or the citizen-
ship question,  that  Missouri  law controlled  Scott's
status  as  a citizen  in Missouri. There are good reasons
for the  old idea that courts  should  decide  only those
issues necessary  to the resolution of the  case at hand.
This idea minimizes the role of judges in the constitu-
tional regime  and allows  room for democratic deliber-
ation  and  debate.  Amazingly,  the Dred Scott Court
took  the opposite  approach;  it decided  every  issue
raised by  the case,  regardless of whether the decision
was necessary to settle Scott's complaint.
Second  and foremost:  The  nation  was  in the
midst  of an  extraordinary  deep  and  wide  debate
about one of the central moral  issues of the time.  It
12is  ludicrous  to  suppose  that  nine  lawyers  in
Washington could  lay this  issue  to  rest  by appeal  to
the  Constitution.  It  is  hubristic  for  nine  lawyers
charged  with  interpreting  the Constitution to think
that they know the right answer  for  the nation as  a
whole.  In  such  cases  the  likelihood  of error is very
high,  and  the  likelihood  of success-a  final  resolu-
tion for a heterogeneous nation-is low even if there
is no error.  The Court should  have  proceeded  with
greatest  caution  unless  it found  the  Constitution
unambiguous  on the point  or  unless  it thought the
moral  principle  so  urgent and  so  plausibly constitu-
tional  in character  as  to require  judicial  endorse-
ment. Neither of these  could  be  said in  Dred  Scott.
The Court should  have decided the case narrowly  by
asking about the status of Missouri law.
LINCOLN  AND  JUDICIAL INSTITUTIONS
I want to say  a word now about the nation's reaction
to Dred Scott, and  about  the  appropriate attitude  of
citizens and  public  officials  to Supreme  Court deci-
sions. My basic point is this: The Supreme  Court has
the last word on cases  that it decides. But interpreta-
tion of the  Constitution  is  emphatically  not  only a
judicial  activity. Constitutional  interpretation  is for
others  as  well. The Supreme  Court  is supreme  but
only in a  limited  way.  It does not preclude constitu-
tional  complaints  by  others  seeking  change.
Certainly this  is so when issues of constitutional  law
are  also  issues of basic  political  principle.  In  such
cases  it  is  especially  important  to insist-as  have
Presidents Jefferson,  Roosevelt,  and Reagan,  among
others-that  the  Supreme  Court has no  monopoly
on constitutional interpretation.
Consider  in this regard  Abraham  Lincoln's  words:
"if  this  important  decision had  been  made  by the
unanimous concurrence  of the judges, and without any
apparent  partisan  bias  and  in accordance  with  legal
public expectation, and with the steady practice  of the
departments  throughout out  history,  and  had been  in
no  part,  based  on  assumed  historical  facts, which  are
not  really  true  or,  if wanting  in  some  of these, had
been  affirmed  and  reaffirmed,  it might  be  factious,
even  revolutionary,  to not acquiesce  in  it. But when
we  find  it wanting  in all these claims  to public confi-
dence,  it is not resistance,  it is not factious,  it is not
even  disrespectful,  to  treat it as not having  yet quite
13established  a settled doctrine  for the country." And  in
1858  Lincoln  said:  "If I were  in  Congress  and  a vote
should  come up on a question whether  slavery  should
be  prohibited in a  new territory,  in spite of that Dred
Scott decision, I would vote that it should."
Lincoln's simplest and  most dramatic statement on
the topic echoed the theme of democratic deliberation
and  a shared  role  in  constitutional  interpretation:
"The candid citizen  must confess that  if the policy  of
the  government,  upon  vital questions  affecting  the
whole people,  is to  irrevocably  fixed by  decisions  of
the  Supreme  Court, the  instant  they  are  made,  in
ordinary litigation between parties in personal actions,
the people  will have  ceased  to be  their  own rulers,
having to that extent practically  resigned the  govern-
ment into the hands of that eminent tribunal."
In this  light we  might  see  the Court  as having  a
dialogic relation with others engaged in political and
moral  deliberation,  and others  thinking  about  the
meaning  of the Constitution. The  Dred Scott  Court
fostered no such dialogue.  In fact  its whole goal  was
preclusive.  But it  is predictable  in  such circum-
stances  that the Court  will fail  and  that voices will
be loudly raised against it. This is certainly so for the
most invasive decisions in the Court's history-Dred
Scott, Lochner v.  New York,  Roe  v.  Wade,  Buckley  v.
Valeo. What the Court ought to do, generally and to
the extent  that it can,  is  act  as  a participant  in
democratic deliberation,  not as the unique "forum  of
principle" in American government.
It  will  not have  escaped  notice  that  this  is an
argument for a degree  of judicial statesmanship.'  It is
an argument  that  there  is no  mechanism  to  deter-
mine the Constitution's  meaning;  that meaning  is  a
function  of judgment;  and  that judgment,  rightly
exercised,  involves both substantive  issues and insti-
tutional constraints.
LESSONS  DRAWN  AND  APPLIED:  AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION,  HOMOSEXUALITY,  THE RIGHT TO  DIE
IN  GENERAL
I have  said  that Dred Scott  was  a  blunder and  an
abuse  because  it purported  to  resolve many  more
issues than were before  the Court, and in that way to
It  is emphatically  not an argument for  Bork-style  "originalism."
See Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (1996).
14resolve  issues of high principle that are fundamental-
ly  for the public, not for the judiciary.  I mean,  then,
to approve  of judicial  casuistry.  Let  us  take  Dred
Scott to  suggest  the  following  points.  First,  courts
should  generally  not set forth  broad  theories  of the
good or the  right;  they should  try  to  bracket  those
issues and leave  them for other places. Second,  they
should, to the extent possible and in general, decide
cases  by reference to modest, low-level  rationales  on
which diverse people can agree.
We  might say that in constitutional  cases,  courts
should  adopt  incompletely  theorized  agreements,
and  in that way  to  economize  on  moral disagree-
ment. This  is  perfectly familiar  in ordinary  life-
families, workplaces,  and much more. We can imag-
ine  many settings  in which  people  who disagree  on
large  abstractions  can  agree on particular  cases.
Certainly this is often true for a faculty;  it is true too
for a polity.  In doing this,  courts can  lower the costs
of decision and also  the costs  of error. And they can
accomplish  one  of the  most  important goals  of a
well-functioning deliberative  democracy, to promote
necessary  agreement  while  minimizing  the problems
created by fundamental disagreement.
Judicial  casuistry  has another  feature.  When  they
are  in  the  midst of a political  thicket,  courts  should
not decide  more cases  than have  been placed  before
them. That is, they should, generally and to the extent
possible, decide  cases with close  reference  to the par-
ticular  issues  presented. This  strategy  decreases  the
cost  of decision,  and  decreased  costs  are a significant
gain. This strategy also allows  large scope for democra-
tic self-governance.  It does  this because  it can  trigger
public  debate,  and  signal  the existence  of issues  of
high  principle,  without at the  same  time  foreclosing
fresh  thinking  or disallowing  the  democratic  public
from resolving the foundational  issues as it chooses.
AFFIRMATIVE  ACTION
Now let us  try to apply these thoughts  to some con-
temporary  issues.  The nation  is  in  the  midst of a
large  debate  over  color-conscious  programs,  and
many  people  have  vigorously  urged  the Supreme
Court  to foreclose  such programs,  whether  deemed
"affirmative  action"  or something  else.  And  there
are  passages  in Supreme  Court decisions  that  read
roughly  like  this:  "In  the  Civil War,  the  nation
15decided  on a  principle  of color-blindness.  Whether
this is a desirable or wise principle  is not for us to say.
But the  issue has been foreclosed  by our heritage."
Or it might  be said, as  a court  of appeals  recently
did,  that  equal protection  clause  has  come  to  be
understood  to embody  a  principle  of race  neutrality
that  is violated  by  all  affirmative  action  programs,
including  those  in  the educational  system.  Thus  in
its remarkable  decision striking down an  affirmative
action plan for the University of Texas Law School,
the court of appeals  said that race-consciousness  was
acceptable  only to remedy  identified  acts of past dis-
crimination.  Thus  public  universities  must proceed
on a  race-neutral basis.  (Through Title VI,  this view
may extend to private universities as well.)
In this form, a court opinion  outlawing affirmative
action  is closely analogous  to Dred Scott,  and defec-
tive-abusive, overreaching-for  the same reason.  It
would  be an  amazing  act of hubris.  In one  form,  a
supposed  past  historical  judgment,  itself not clearly
embodied  in the constitutional  text,'  is used to fore-
close  democratic experimentation.  (Recall  Dred Scott
on  citizenship  and  the Missouri  Compromise.)  In
another form, a general principle  ("color-blindness")
is announced to foreclose  such experimentation even
though  the principle  covers  a wide  range  of situa-
tions,  some  of which  seem  to  draw the  principle  in
some  doubt  (as  where  race  is a minor  factor  used
alongside many other minor factors).  We might com-
pare  the  narrower,  fact-intensive,  casuistical
approaches  characteristic  of Justice  Powell  in the
Bakke case and on occasion Justice O'Connor.
My  simple  proposition  is  this:  There  are  many
kinds of affirmative  action  programs.  The  nation  has
embarked on a  large-scale debate about such programs.
That debate  raises  issues  of both morality  and  fact.
Ultimately  the  place  of affirmative  action  programs
should  be decided  democratically,  not  judicially.
8 There  is  no  evidence  that the  equal protection  clause  was
intended  to stop  affirmative  action,  and considerable  evidence  to  the
contrary. In fact those who ratified the fourteenth  amendment engaged
in race-conscious  remedial  programs.  It would  be most  refreshing  if
some of the originalist justices on  the Court, who  tend to oppose affir-
mative action on constitutional  grounds, would  invoke some historical
support for  their views  (it  is hard  to find  any),  or would  say  that
although they personally do not like affirmative  action, the history for-
bids them from invalidating  it on  constitutional grounds. I am  indebt-
ed to David Strauss for this thought.
16There  is no  sufficiently  clear  constitutional  commit-
ment to color blindness to justify judicial intrusion.
Of course  this is not to  say that affirmative  action
programs are always good. Some  of them are very bad.
In any  case  they  are  extraordinarily  diverse.  Their
validity depends  on the details. And in  these circum-
stances,  courts  should  be  attentive  to  the details.
They should proceed modestly and casuistically.
We  are  now  in a position  to  discuss  the  possible
catalytic  role  of the Supreme  Court  insofar  as  that
role bears  on the  affirmative action debate. Suppose
that it is agreed  that the  issue of affirmative  action
should  be  decided  democratically  rather  than judi-
cially-but  suppose  too that  institutions are operat-
ing in such a way as to ensure that many public deci-
sions are taken in an unaccountable  way and are not
really  a product of democratic  judgments.  This  is  a
plausible  description  of affirmative  action  programs
between the period, say,  1975 and  1990. A meander-
ing, casuistical,  rule-free path may well be  a salutary
way  of signaling  the  existence  of large  questions  of
policy  and principle,  at  least  with  constitutional
dimensions,  when  those questions  would  otherwise
receive  far  less  attention  than  they deserve. Hence
the  participants  in Supreme  Court  cases  have
become familiar "characters"  in the national debate,
helping to frame  discussion:  Bakke, Weber, Johnson,
minority construction contractors, and others.
In fact  the Court  has mostly  acted  in  this  way.
Some  of the justices have undoubtedly  been aware  of
the difficulty and variousness of the affirmative action
problem  and  have  chosen  a  casuistical  approach  for
this  reason. The  Court's decisions  have  been among
the  factors  that have  kept affirmative  action  in the
public  eye  and helped  focus the public  on  issues  of
principle  and policy. This  is the  best that can be  said
for the  Court's rule-free  path. When it confronts the
admissions  policy of the University  of Texas,  the
Court should continue  in this way,  looking closely  at
the details,  and avoiding broad pronouncements.  But
what  I want  to  emphasize  here  is that  it would  be  a
democratic disaster if the Court, Dred Scott-style,  were
to foreclose  further democratic  debate  in the name  of
the "color-blindness" principle.
THE RIGHT TO  DIE
We  are  in  the midst  of a  constitutional  attack  on
17laws  that forbid  state-assisted  suicide.  The  right-to-
die  debate  is along  one  dimension  significantly  dif-
ferent from the debate  over affirmative action. Here
the relevant  laws have  been on the books for a  long
time,  and  they  have not,  as  a  general  rule,  been
revisited by recently elected officials.
Do  such  laws  invade  a  constitutional  "right  to
privacy"?  Many  people and  some  courts  think  so.
Invoking  the authority  of Roe  v.  Wade, such  people
say that  the government  cannot  legitimately  inter-
fere  with  self-regarding  choices  about what  to  do
"with their bodies,"  and that  therefore the choice  is
for the  individual,  not for  the state.  Several  courts
have recently gone  in this direction.
Thus stated,  the argument  for  a  constitutional
right to die  raises many  questions and many doubts.
Substantive  due  process  does  not  deserve  wide
acceptance.  For reasons I have suggested,  it is textu-
ally awkward,  to say the  least. Moreover, the condi-
tions  in which  a  right  to  die might  be asserted  are
widely variable. Perhaps some people choosing death
would be  confused  or  myopic. Perhaps  some  doctors
would overbear their patients;  perhaps some families
could not  entirely be  trusted.  In view of the  com-
plexity  of the  underlying  issues  of value  and  fact-
our now-familiar theme-courts should be extremely
reluctant to try to  resolve  this issue through judicial
declaration. They lack the fact-finding  expertise  and
policymaking  competence.  Thus recent  court deci-
sions announcing  a  large-scale  "right to  die"  are
another version of the  Hopwood case;  they  are  mod-
est reruns of Dred Scott itself.
Does this mean that courts should say nothing  at
all? Perhaps. But there is an alternative,  and  it bears
on the  principal  difference  between  the affirmative
action  controversy  and  the controversy  over  the
right  to die.  I think the  most  promising  and  inge-
nious solution,  set  out by  Judge  Guido Calebresi,
attempts  to  promote  a  kind  of dialogue  between
courts and  the public. Let us notice first that the rel-
evant  laws  were  enacted  long  ago.  They  were
designed  to prevent  people  from  being accessory  to
suicide;  that was their fundamental  purpose.  Suicide
was considered  a genuine  crime.  But this reason for
the  statutes  no  longer  holds  much  weight.
Enforcement  of  those  laws  has  fallen  into  near-
desuetude.  In  any  case  these are  not really  cases  of
suicide,  and  the  technology  has  much  changed,
18making possible forms of euthanasia  that would have
been unimaginable when the  laws were first enacted.
The central point, for those interested  in democ-
ratic deliberation,  is that  there  has  been  no recent
legislative  engagement  with the underlying  moral
and technological  issues.  In these circumstances, it is
appropriate  for  a  court  to say that  the state  has not
demonstrated  an adequate reason  to interfere  with a
private  choice  of this  kind-unless  and  until  a
recent legislature  is able  to show that there is a  suffi-
ciently recent  commitment to  this  effect  to support
fresh legislation.
Understood  in this way,  the right to die cases  are
reminiscent of the Connecticut contraceptives case,
Griswold  v.  Connecticut, as  I would  understand  that
case in the light of Dred Scott. In Griswold the Court
embarked on the basis of taking large-scale positions
on matters  of political  morality  by  speaking  of  a
nonexistent  constitutional  "right  of privacy."
Instead  the Court might  have  taken  a very narrow
approach  in Griswold.  It  might  have  said  that  laws
that lack  real enforcement,  that appear  no longer to
reflect  considered  political  convictions,  cannot  be
used against private citizens  in decisions  of this kind
on what  is predictably  and  almost inevitably  a ran-
dom basis.
The  underlying,  time-honored  principle-that
involving desuetude-has strong democratic founda-
tions. The principle condemning  desuetude  says that
when an old law is practically unenforced  because  it
does not  receive sufficient  public approval,  ordinary
citizens are  permitted to  violate  it, and  in  that way
to  call democratic  attention  to the  space  between
the law  as  popularly  conceived  and  approved  and
the law as it exists on the books.
An  idea  of this sort,  I suggest,  would  be  a  singu-
larly good  way  of beginning  the constitutional
debate  about the right  to die. It  would  not involve
judicial  prohibition.  It  would  begin  the debate  by
putting the  burden of deliberation on representative
bodies accountable  to the people.
HOMOSEXUALITY
Now  turn  to claims  that the Constitution  forbids
discrimination  on  the  basis  of sexual  orientation.
Here plaintiffs'  lawyers  are  invoking  a  principle  of
human  equality  to  invalidate  democratic  outcomes.
19Here  some  people  insist  that  a  properly  capacious
notion of constitutional  equality  adequately justifies
an aggressive  judicial role.
I will assert,  without defending  the  point here,
that that notion of equality  does seem  to me to con-
nect  very  well with  the  equality  principle  that
underlies the Civil War Amendments.  Let us simply
assume  that  this claim  is right.  We  might  even
assume,  at  least  for purposes  of argument,  that the
rightness of the constitutional  claim  is very  clear,
and that the homosexual  case  is therefore  different
from cases involving  affirmative  action and the  right
to die, which seem in any case difficult.  And then-
having made  things  especially  hard for  ourselves-
let us ask about the Court's appropriate  role, return-
ing to Abraham Lincoln in the process.
Abraham Lincoln always insisted  that slavery  was
wrong.  On the  basic principle,  Lincoln  allowed  no
compromises. No justification was available  for chat-
tel  slavery.  But  on the  question  of means,  Lincoln
was  quite equivocal-flexible,  strategic,  open  to
compromise,  aware  of doubt. The  fact that  slavery
was wrong did not mean that it had to be eliminated
immediately,  or  that blacks  and  whites  had to  be
placed  immediately  on  a  plane  of equality.  On
Lincoln's  view,  the  feeling  of "the  great  mass  of
white  people"  would  not permit  this result.  In  his
most striking formulation:  "Whether this  feeling
accords with justice  and  sound argument,  is not the
sole question, if indeed, it is any part of it. A  univer-
sal feeling,  whether  well  or ill-founded,  can not  be
safely disregarded."  What  is most striking about this
claim  is the  view  that the  inconsistency  of a  "feel-
ing" with  justice  or sound  argument  may be  irrele-
vant to the question  of what  to do at any particular
point in time.
On  Lincoln's  view,  efforts  to  create  immediate
social  change  in this  especially  sensitive  area could
have  disastrous  unintended  consequences  or  back-
fire,  even  if those  efforts were  founded  on  entirely
sound principle.  It  was  necessary  first  to educate
people  about the reasons  for the change.  Important
interests  had  to  be  accommodated  or  persuaded  to
come  on board. Issues of timing  were crucial. Critics
had to  be heard and  respected.  For Lincoln,  rigidity
about  the principle  would  always be  combined with
caution about  the means  by  which the just outcome
would be  brought  about.  For this  reason  it is  a  mis-
20take  to  see  Lincoln's  caution with  respect  to aboli-
tion  as indicating  uncertainty  about  the underlying
principle.  But  it  is  equally  mistaken  to think that
Lincoln's  certainty  about  the  principle  entailed
immediate implementation  of racial equality.
The  point  is  highly  relevant  to  constitutional
law, especially  in the area of social reform. Return to
my  basic theme: As it operates  in the courts, consti-
tutional law is a peculiar mixture  of substantive the-
ory  and  institutional constraint. Suppose,  for exam-
ple, that the ban on same-sex  marriage is challenged
on equal  protection grounds.  Even  if judges  find the
challenge  plausible  in its  substance,  there  is  much
reason  for caution  on the part of the courts.  An
immediate judicial vindication of the principle could
well jeopardize  important  interests.  It  could galva-
nize opposition. It could weaken  the antidiscrimina-
tion movement itself as that movement  is operating
in democratic  arenas.  (Compare  Roe  v.  Wade.)  It
could  provoke  more hostility  and  even violence
against  homosexuals.  It would  certainly  jeopardize
the authority of the judiciary.
Is  it  too pragmatic  and  strategic,  too  obtusely
unprincipled,  to  suggest  that judges  should  take
account of these considerations?  I do not believe  so.
Prudence  is not the  only  virtue;  it  is  certainly  not
the master virtue; but it is a virtue nonetheless.  At a
minimum,  it seems  plausible  to  suggest  that  courts
should generally  use their discretion over their dock-
et in order to limit the timing of relevant  intrusions
into the  political  process.  It  also  seems  plausible to
suggest that  courts  should  be  reluctant  to  vindicate
even  good  principles  when  the vindication  would
compromise  other interests, at least if those interests
include, ultimately, the principles  themselves.
In  the  area  of homosexuality,  we  might  make
some  distinctions.  If the Supreme  Court  of the
United  States  accepted  the  view that states  must
authorize  same-sex  marriages  in  1996, or even 1998,
we should expect  a constitutional crisis, a weakening
of the  legitimacy  of the Court,  an intensifying  of
hatred  of homosexuals,  a constitutional  amendment
overturning  the Court's  decision,  and  much  more.
Any  Court  should  hesitate  in the  face  of such
prospects.  It would  be  far better for  the Court to do
nothing-or  better  yet,  to start  cautiously  and  to
proceed incrementally.
The Court might,  for example, conclude  that the
21equal  protection  clause  forbids  state constitutional
amendments  that forbid  ordinary  democratic
processes  to  outlaw discrimination  on the  basis  of
sexual  orientation.  The Court might  say  that such
amendments,  of the sort that has been enacted  (and
invalidated  judicially)  in Colorado,  do  not merely
discriminate  on the  basis  of sexual orientation,  but
also disfavor  a defined  group in the political  process,
in  a  way  that involves  issues of both  animus  and
political  equality.  A  judicial  ruling of this kind
would be quite narrow.  In fact  the Court proceeded
very much  in  this  way  in  its laudable  decision  in
Romer v.  Evans.
Or  the  Court  might  say-as  some  lower  courts
have done-that government  cannot rationally  dis-
criminate  against people of homosexual orientation,
without showing  that those people  have engaged  in
acts  that harm  any  legitimate government  interest.
Narrow rulings  of this  sort  would  allow  room  for
public  discussion  and  debate,  before  obtaining  a
centralized  national  ruling that  preempts  ordinary
political process.
Armed  with an understanding  of Dred Scott,  we
can go much further. Constitutional  law  is not only
for the courts;  it is for all public  officials.  The origi-
nal  understanding  was  that deliberation  about  the
Constitution's  meaning  would be  part of the  func-
tion  of the  President  and  legislators  as  well. The
post-Warren  Court  identification  of  the
Constitution  with the  decisions  of the  Supreme
Court has  badly disserved the traditional  American
commitment to deliberative democracy.  In that sys-
tem, all officials-not only the judges-have  a duty
of fidelity  to the  founding  document.  And  in that
system,  we  should  expect  that elected  officials  will
have  a  degree  of interpretive  independence  from
the judiciary.  We should even  expect that they will
sometimes  fill  the  institutional  gap  created  by  the
courts' lack of fact-finding  ability and policymaking
competence.  For  this  reason,  they may  conclude
that  practices  are  unconstitutional  even  if the
Court  would uphold  them, or  that  practices  are
valid even  if the Court would  invalidate  them.
Lincoln  is  an  important  example here  as well.
Often he  invoked constitutional  principles to  chal-
lenge chattel  slavery,  even though  the  Supreme
Court had rejected  that reading of the Constitution
in the Dred Scott case.
22CONCLUSION
It  is  time  to conclude.  The  Dred  Scott opinion was
an  abomination,  and  it  was an  abomination  in  two
different  ways.  The first  has  to  do  with substantive
law:  Freed  slaves  should  have  qualified  as  citizens.
The Missouri  Compromise  was  a  legitimate  exercise
of legislative  authority.  The serious  question  in the
case was whether  Missouri's  view about Scott's status
was  binding.  That  was  a  little  question,  not a big
one, and the Court  should  have stayed  with the lit-
tle question.
But  Dred  Scott was  also an  abomination  in ways
that  have  to do  with  institutional  role.  The Court
did not merely  decide  Dred Scott's case;  it managed
at  once  to  assert  that  it lacked  jurisdiction  and  to
strike  down an  act  of Congress not  directly  bearing
on the jurisdictional  issue-an especially  neat trick.
The Court purported to make the original intentions
of the framers binding, even though  those intentions
were  murky, did not compel  the Court's conclusion,
and  were  not  in  the  Constitution  itself.  Perhaps
worst  of all,  the Court  deliberately  reached  out  to
decide  nationally  crucial  issues  that deserved  and
would  ultimately  receive  an  answer  from the  people
rather than the judiciary.
Thus understood, Dred Scott offers many lessons for
those  interested  in the  modem Supreme  Court. As a
general  presumption,  it argues  against efforts  to  take
the great moral issues out of politics. It argues in favor
of an approach  that sees constitutional  interpretation
and moral deliberation  as tasks for representatives  and
citizens  generally,  not just for judges.  It  suggests that
the  great  issues  of political  morality-affirmative
action, the right to die, homosexual rights-are most-
ly  for political processes, not for courts.
This does not suggest that courts should  do noth-
ing. I have  argued that  in all  three  areas, courts  can
perform  a catalytic  role.  Democratic  deliberation  is
not a mere matter of counting  noses. The Court can
do  a great  deal  of good  in promoting  more  rather
than less in the way of both democracy and delibera-
tion.  It can do  a great deal  of bad  in  producing  less
rather than more of these things.
This,  I suggest,  is not  a  myth.  It  is  the  enduring
lesson of Dred Scott. At least it is the enduring  lesson
for  a Court that has  an  accommodating  spirit,  and
that is not too sure that it is right.
23CODA
I have  a  coda.  It consists of notes  about  what hap-
pened to the people in the case.
John  Sanford  was  insane and institutionalized  by
the  time the  decision  was  announced.  He died  on
May 5,  1857.
Despite the Court's  decision, Dred Scott eventu-
ally won  his  freedom,  because  after  the  Court ren-
dered  its decision  Calvin  Chaffee,  Irene  Emerson's
new  husband,  and his  new  wife  took  immediate
measures  to free  Dred Scott.  Scott lived  as  a free
man-working  as  a  hotel  porter-for  just a  year
before his death from tuberculosis  in 1858.
Until very recently,'  history had lost the stories of
Harriet Scott,  Eliza  Scott,  Lizzie  Scott, and  their
descendants.  We now  know  that Harriet  Scott  sur-
vived  the Civil War and the thirteenth  amendment;
that  Eliza never  married  and spent  much  of her life
caring  for her mother;  that  Eliza  had children  and
her great-grandson-Dred  and  Harriet's  great-great-
grandson-is now living in Missouri.
Dred Scott's grave went unmarked and unnoticed
for many decades; but at the centennial of the  Dred
Scott case,  in 1957,  a granddaughter of Taylor Blow
provided  a granite  headstone  for his grave,  where  it
can now  be  seen in  Calvary  Cemetery  in St. Louis,
Missouri.
President Lincoln  signed  the  Emancipation
Proclamation  on January  1, 1863.  The nation-We
the People-ratified  the  Fourteenth Amendment  in
1868,  overruling  Dred Scott  through  democratic
means,  with  its opening words,  "all persons  born or
naturalized  in the  United  States  are  citizens of the
United States and of the State wherein they reside."
A  valuable  discussion  is  Lea  VanderVelde  and  Sandhya
Subramanian,  Mrs. Dred Scott (unpublished  manuscript 1996).
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